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ABSTRACT
Alan Auerbach and Kevin Hassett offer a new measure of horizontal equity (HE) that is
designed to overcome deficiencies in prior indexes. There is, however, a fundamental problem that
their effort shares with their predecessors' attempts: the underlying rationale for pursuing HE at the
expense of individuals' well-being is never stated. Moreover, as discussed here, it appears that no
plausible rationale can be given because the essence of HE involves giving weight to morally
arbitrary factors. Indeed, pursuing HE may even conflict with the Pareto principle. On reflection,
it seems that the appeal of HE is specious: HE does not possess intrinsic value, but rather is a rough
proxy concept that may signal various ways in which unequal treatment of individuals can lead to







Alan Auerbach and Kevin Hassett (1999, 2000) (All) offer a new, sophisticated measure
of horizontal equity (HE) that is designed to overcome the shortcomings of prior measures.1 One
caimot, however, assess their new index without first answering an essential, prior question: why
is it that we care about HE? After all, whether an index is a good one depends on its relationship
to what it is supposed to measure. Like almost all of the prior literature that develops HE
indexes, however, All do not really address this issue.
There is, in addition, a more serious problem with the tendency to take the importance of
HE for granted. If the AH approach to policy assessment is followed, society will be advised to
adopt policies that sacrifice individuals' well-being on account of their favorable effect on HE.
But such a result is surely undesirable if, as it turns out, HE should not in itself be endowed with
independent normative significance.
My argument here is that AJ-1 —indeed,the whole literature that attempts to measure HE
—hasjumped the gun in a fundamental sense.2 When one carefully examines the concept of HE
and what its pursuit entails, one discovers there is no normative basis for deeming it to be
important and, in fact, it conflicts with the basic foundations of welfare economics. That is, HE
stands in opposition to the advancement of human welfare. Indeed, consistent pursuit of HE can
conflict with the Pareto principle. To give weight to HE entails making policy judgments
'Musgrave (1990), like AH, attempts to derive an HE index that is closely related to the conventional social
welfare function. In Kaplow (1992),! criticized Musgrave's measure not only because it applied only to precise equals
but also because it was not grounded in —andwas inconsistent with —eachof the normative principles (including social
welfare maximization) that Musgrave identified in the first portion of his article.
2Many of the arguments discussed here derive from ideas that were originally advanced in Kaplow (1989). Also,
Kaplow (1995) discusses in detail the point that the pursuit of T-!E clashes with the values underlying welfare economics
and, in particular, the Pareto principle.
—1—dependent on information (in the case of AH's index, pre-tax income levels) that has no bearing
on any individual's actual well-being. And, when one considers the factors that implicitly are
given independent weight (such as individuals' genes and luck), it turns out that they are
arbitrary from just about any plausible moral perspective.
Why is it, then, that the notion of HE has such intuitive appeal? The answer, in
significant part, seems to be that the notion of HE —aconcern for equal treatment of equals
serves as a proxy device that enables us to identify factors that are potentially relevant to welfare.
Notably, unequal treatment of equals may indicate mistakes in welfare maximization (for if
individuals truly are equal, the optimal treatment for each will typically be the same), income
inequality (which would already be captured by an ordinary social welfare function), imposition
of risk, reasons for envy by those treated less well than their peers, or evidence of abuse of power
(such as invidious discrimination or government officials' targeting of their enemies).
Clearly, contemplating the unequal treatment of equals brings to mind myriad instances
in which something is amiss. Yet each of the problems just identified involves a reduction in
welfare, as that notion is conventionally understood. Thus, HE's role in alerting us to these
problems does not provide any basis for deeming HE to be an independent normative principle,
to be pursued at the expense of individuals' well-being.
Finally, with regard to employing the notion of HE as a proxy device, the tax policy
literature's use of HE is, unfortunately, not very helpful. Some of the identified problems
especially invidious discrimination and abuse of power —havelittle or nothing to do with the
defects of the tax code that are being studied, even though they have everything to do with why
the concern for equal treatment is felt to be important. Moreover, the sort of HE index developed
-2-by AH (and by others) simply does not relate very directly, if at all, to any of the potential
problems that may be caused by unequal treatment. That is, even though identifying instances of
apparent unequal treatment of equals may aid the analyst in diagnosing various defects in the tax
system, AH's aggregate measure, along with its focus on deviations from individuals' positions
in the pre-tax distribution of income, provides little indication of whether any such defects exist
or of how to go about remedying them.
2. An Illustration: On the Moral Arbitrariness of HE
Because the implications of sophisticated HE indexes like AH's are difficult to
understand in complex settings, I begin by examining the most basic sort of example for
assessing HE: there are only two income levels before tax and two after tax, and two individuals
at each initial income level (to allow for the possibility of unequal treatment of equals). More
precisely, the scenario is as follows.
Time 0: Nature creates four people: two of type H (for high income-earning ability) and
two of type L (low ability). The two H's are identical to each other in all morally relevant
respects, and likewise for the two L's. All individuals have the same utility thnctions, and all
work the same amount of time.3 The only difference is that, in the pre-tax world (or whatever
other world serves as the benchmark), the two H's earn more income than the two L's. That is,
the H's have good "ability luck" and the L's have bad ability luck.
Time I: A tax system is enacted to finance a public good. It is supposed to raise the
same amount of revenue from each of the two H's and from each of the two L's.4 It turns out,
3To obtain this result, one can simply take labor as exogenous (as in AH), or instead suppose that individuals'
utility functions are such that income and substitution effects are offsetting.
'It does not matter whether it is a lump-sum tax, a tax proportional to income, or any other tax.
-3-however, that due to human limitations, there is some bungling in the administration of the tax,
so that not everyone in fact pays the proper amount of the tax. This bungling produces the
following results:
• One of the H's ends up exactly where H's should end up. This person will be designated
HH.
• One of the H's is mistakenly overtaxed, and ends up exactly where the L's are supposed
to end up. Call this person HL. (Which H ends up in which position is determined by
nature at time 1.)
• One of the L's ends up exactly where L's should end up: LL.
• One of the L's is mistakenly undertaxed, so much so that he ends up exactly where the
H's should: LH.5 (Again, which L ends up in which position is determined by nature at
time 1.)
Here, there is unequal treatment both between the H's and between the L's. Individuals HH and
LH have good "administrative luck," while HL and LL have bad administrative luck.
How HE influences the assessment of social welfare: Under a standard social welfare
function, which is concerned only with where individuals end up, the extent of HE is no matter
for concern. What matters is that we have two individuals who end up as H's should end up and
two who end up as L's should end up. The actual utility profiles are precisely the same as they
would be if tax administration were perfect. Because the welfare thnction weights all individuals
equally, which individuals end up in which positions is of no consequence.
In contrast, by any measure of HE, including the AH measure, there is a gross violation
of HE, so "welfare" is deemed to be lower on this account.6 This is to say that there is some
5One can suppose that the tax due by the Fl's is sufficiently large (or that the difference between the incomes of
the H's and L's is sufficiently small) that this is possible. Alternatively, one could allow for negative taxes (transfers) in
the overall system.
6For indexes that express a concern for rank reversals in the income distribution, there is also a violation of HE
in this illustration.
-4-(strictly positive) amount of resources that society should be willing to sacrifice in order to
eliminate the administrative error from the tax system. If this were done, as long as the cost were
less than the implicit social reservation price, we would deem welfare to be higher.
Alternatively, if society could simply choose between two systems, one with the above
characteristics and one that resulted in HH, HH, LL, LL (at the same administrative cost), society
would be deemed to be strictly better off if it adopted the latter.
Implication: What this example clearly demonstrates is that the essence of HE lies in a
willingness to sacrifice social welfare —thatis, to reduce individuals' well-being —inorder to
ensure that some types of luck —here,ability luck —havemore influence than other types of
luckhere, administrative luck —onwhich individuals end up with higher welfare.7 In the
light of this fact, it is hard to imagine what plausible philosophical theory would warrant giving
weight to HE. And any normative theory that might justifSi HE surely would conflict in the most
basic way with the ethical foundations of welfare economics.
Variation: To ffirther illustrate this problem with HE, reconsider the preceding
illustration. There, I said that nature first determined (at time 0) individuals' ability luck, that
this sort of luck was morally significant (it was ability luck, after all, that determined where
individuals were "supposed" to end up in the final income distribution), and that nature only later
(at time 1) determined who had administrative luck.
7The particular approach of AH is to compare individua]s to those with similar pre-tax incomes. Thus, the focus
in the preceding illustration was on earnings ability, a primary deten-ninant of one's relative position In the pre-tax income
distribution. Most other writers have instead examined the effect of tax reforms rather than tax systems, with the
benchmark being the after-tax income distribution that exists prior to the tax reform in question. Similarly, one could
refer to any benchmark for the distribution of income (such as one determined by some caste system or by lot) —orfor
the distribution of wealth, consumption, or whatever. The common point is that any approach to lIE must privÜege some
distribution that will not exist once the system under examination is in place. In particular, the posited distribution will
count —insome manner that depends on the particu]ar measure —toan extent that depends on how much the actual
resulting distribution of income (the only one under which individuals will actually live once a policy is chosen) deviates
from the benchmark distribution.
-5-Now suppose that we change the assumptions slightly, so that the order is reversed. That
is, assume instead that nature first determines administrative luck, that it is this sort of luck that
is morally significant, and that only later does nature (arbitrarily) determine who h.as ability
luck.8
How does this recharacterization change our analysis? Under conventional welfare
economics, of course, none of this is relevant. This is because, as noted, individuals are viewed
anonymously; it does not matter who in particular ends up in each position, but only the levels of
welfare that individuals are able to achieve, Accordingly, the order in which nature bestows
traits is not per se of independent normative significance.
But under the AM-modified welfare fhnction (and others in the literature), everything
reverses. The reason is simple. HE requires the equal treatment of equals. Here, it is the
administrative luck attribute that exists first and is thereby deemed to be the proper determinant
of individuals' positions in the final income distribution. That is, the (previously) latter attribute
now determines who are the "equals" who should be treated equally, not the former. As a result,
what previously was viewed as "error" in tax administration now must be understood as a
correction to the now-viewed-as-inequitable pre-tax distribution of income. (In terms of the
original notation, the change in assumptions means that the second letter, not the first, is morally
privileged. In the pre-tax world, FIlL, who should be treated as an L, was treated as an H, and
LH, who should be treated as an H, was treated as an L. It is the tax system's administrative
scheme that gives everyone a welfare level indicated by their second letter, making all equitable.)
recharacterization can be described in many ways, depending on when nature detemiines the underlying
characteristics, when we observe them, and so forth. Also, one could hold all of this constant and have different
technologies. (For example, the original H type might be the administratively lucky type rather than the high-ability type,
and the trait that previously led to administrative luck might instead lead to higher productivity.)
-5-Incurring costs to eliminate this "error" not only would be wasteffil, but would actually reduce
"welfare" even exclusive of these costs.
Comments: Simply changing assumptions about the order in which nature's luck is
manifested (perhaps invisibly) in individuals or about which aspects of such luck (the timing of
their origin? of their first manifestation?) are deemed morally significant fhndamentally changes
what violates HE. Indeed, the direction of the effect is reversed. But given the essential nature
of HE, noted above, this should not be surprising. After all, the HE view consists of a normative
stance that some of nature's random moves (ability in the initial example) are to be endowed
with normative significance, whereas subsequent random moves (administrative luck) —or
earlier random moves that are observed subsequently or simply are listed subsequently by the
analyst —areto be treated as normatively irrelevant, mere noise that interferes with the proper
moral order.9
Should any of these traits be endowed with moral significance? Which ones? And why?
A basic feature of the welfare economic tradition is that such traits have no intrinsic moral
significance. Moreover, the philosophical basis for many views favorable to any redistribution
of income —suchas Harsanyi's (1953) derivation of utilitarianism and Rawls's (1971) argument
for maximin, both of which appeal to an "original position" —aregrounded in the moral
conviction that such background traits (and, in particular, traits affecting income-earning ability,
which are primarily responsible for the pre-tax distribution of income) are morally irrelevant.10
That, after all, is why efforts at enhanced equality in the distribution of income are viewed
90f course, in many instances, we do not even know which traits came first, and we may suppose that often they
arise simultaneously (as would be true of genetic traits).
'°Libertarian views, which are opposed to redistribution, are more consistent with favoring some such notion of
HE, but they are also opposed to redistributive taxation in the first place. See Kaplow (1989).
-7-positively rather than seen as an evil.1'
To continue to pursue HE, therefore, it seems that two steps are necessary. First, a
proponent must identif' particular traits (genetic ones?) and offer moral arguments indicating
why they should have normative significance. Second, analysts would need to determine the
actual distribution of the relevant traits in society and use this information in constructing a
measure of HE. (That is, one caimot simply choose the pie-tax income distribution, as in AH, or
the pie-reform income distribution, as in much prior literature on HE; instead, one would need to
know how close each individual was to everyone else with regard to the identified, morally
relevant set of traits.)12
"Another way to put the point is to observe that the AH approach gives specia] normative weight to the pre-tax
distribution of income whereas the very purpose of the tax system, both as a whole and with respect to many particulars, is
to alter that distribution. Thus, our tax system is explicitly redistributive, and many detailed provisions are designed to
favor certain individuals over others. To privilege the pre-tax distribution over the after-tax distribution is thus, in
general, not merely unwarranted but literally backwards. (Much of the prior literature instead privileges the pre-reform
distribution instead of the pre-tax distribution, but, of course, the purpose of a reform is precisely to make changes from
what previously existed. See Kaplow (1989).)
'2To reinforce the point that these demands are inherent in the nature of HE, it is worth elaborating further on the
concept. The notion that equals should be treated equally presupposes that there exist individuals who are equals, who
must, in turn, be treated equally. That is, there are predefined groups, the members of each group are more or less equal to
each other in some morally relevant sense, and this is all understood to exist before application of the relevant "treatment"
(in the present context, the tax system, which determines individuals' actual levels of well.being).
Another defining feature of HE is that the relevant groups must to some extent be insular. In contrast, if one
were to define a single relevant group, the entire population (deeming all humans to be equals), HE would vanish as an
independent concept. After all, if we were concerned about the treatment of each individual with respect to all others, and
each of these relationships were to be viewed equally, we would be left with a conventional social welfare function, which
treats everyone equally and places weight on equality of income (whether on account of the declining marginal utility of
income or because the welfare function is itself concave in utilities). (The ordinary concern for overall equality is
sometimes referred to under the rubric of vertical equity, from which HE is sharply distinguished. In Kaplow (1989),
however, I suggest that there may be some confusion about this because the standard examples used in the literature to
motivate concern for HE often involve the sort of inequality that would already be registered by an ordinary welfare
function, which gives weight to inequality per se.)
Thus, in considering the circumstances of individuals, the comparison with all others is notviewedequally under
HE. Rather, how individuals are treated relative to those others deemed sufficiently comparable in some respect(s) is
asserted to be of different moral importance from how the individuals are treated relative to those not deemed comparable.
(The measure proposed by AH allows for the reference groups to be defined continuously in the sense that everyone can
be in everyone else's group, with those having more nearly equal pre-tax incomes being weighted more heavily. But the
point here is not to challenge the precise weighting or whether the reference group has a definite boundary, but rather to
question the basis of giving different normative weight to comparisons with different individuals in the first place.)
-8-3. Why Any Notion of HE Is Indefensible: Conflict with the Pareto Principle
In the literature, there has never really been an explicit, affirmative attempt to justi' HE
as an independent normative principle.'3 And, as the foregoing discussion suggests, pursuing HE
seems, at its core, to entail giving weight to morally arbitrary factors, at the expense of social
welfare. This latter point, it turns out, can be put more sharply: giving any weight to HE is ruled
out fone adheres to tworatherbasic ideas, logical consistency and the Pareto principle)4
Thus, although AR appeal directly to the utilitarian tradition and to economists' conventional
social welfare function and offer a measure of HE that has a mathematical form suggestive of
such roots, it is in fact the case that their HE index —anyHE index —isin fundamental conflict
with the basic premises of the entire approach that they draw on for support.
Example for first demonstration of Pareto conflict: One way to demonstrate that HE
conflicts with the Pareto principle is to examine a case involving uncertainty, paralleling the
approach of Harsanyi (1955, 1977) who used this method to show (roughly) that logical
consistency plus the Pareto implied that an individualistic social welfare function had to be
utilitarian. To do this, consider an extremely simple example in which everyone is initially
equal. The reader may interpret this example equivalently as involving any number of groups of
individuals at different income levels, with everyone in each group identical to each other.
The tax regime at issue has the following characteristics: it raises the mean income (of
13Musgrave (1990) is the only paper that comes close. As I explain in Kaplow (1992), however, he merely
shows that I-TB is consistentwithvarious phi]osophical theories in a simp]e, first-best world. (This is related to the point,
noted in section 4, that when a particular treatment is optimal, under some criterion, for individual 1, and individual 2 is
identical to 1, the same treatment will, in simple cases, likewise be optimal for 2.) Musgrave does not explain why any of
the identified normative theories would call for giving independent weight to HE, to be pursued at the expense of what the
theory deems to be important.
'4See Kaplow (1995), Kaplow and Shavell (1999).
-9-each group) but also thvolves some variance. That is, the tax regime entails some randomization,
so that some individuals (in each group) will end up with incomes above the mean (for the
group) and others will end up with incomes lower than the mean, and perhaps lower than their
initial income level.
Obviously, this tax regime will involve some loss in HE. Let I be the per capita income-
equivalent measure of the resulting inequity under whatever measure of HE is deemed to be
appropriate. Now, suppose that individuals' risk aversion is such that the increase in the mean
income minus the risk premium associated with the randomization is strictly positive, but less
than I. What implications follow?
Under the Pareto principle, the tax regime would be deemed desirable, for everyone
prefers that it be adopted)6 Moreover, under any conventional social welfare function (which
will give no weight to HE), this regime will be favored as well. But, under the All approach —
orany other that gives HE positive weight —thisregime would be deemed undesirable because
the reduction in HE outweighs the gain in welfare. That is, a "welfare" function that gives
weight to HE and is applied in a logically consistent manner to evaluate all possible tax regimes
will, in some instances, favor regimes that are Pareto dominated.
'5Taking a given measure of HE, one can construct such an examp]e by choosing individuals' utility functions
with sufficiently small risk aversion that their welfare rises as a result of implementing the tax (or tax refonn) but with
sufficiently large risk aversion that, when one subtracts I, the aggregate welfare function (which incorporates HE) falls.
(Assuming that the measures are continuous, which AH emphasize as a prerequisite of any plausible HE measure, this will
generally be possible.)
'6One strategy to avoid the problem raised by the example in the text would be to apply the AH welfare function
not to the ex post distribution of income but rather to the ex ante expected utilities. (That is, one would modify the AH
approach by looking ex ante rather than ex post and substituting utility for income.) Taking this view to its logical
conclusion, however, implies that one should consider expected utility behind a "veil of ignorance." As vickrey (1945)
suggests and Harsanyi (1953, 1977) proves, however, such an approach also implies a utilitarian welfare function, in
which HE receives no weight. (One might also note that there is a sort of time consistency problem with the ex ante
approach when HE is given weight. Ex ante, as just observed, the posited tax is favored. Once it is implemented,
however, and the uncertainty is resolved, it would be optimal —applyingthe HE-type welfare function —torepeal the
tax, for the existing situation is evaluated as inferior to that which would exist without the tax.)
-10-Comments: That giving weight to HE may involve a conflict with the Pareto principle
reinforces the point that the prior literature's failure to give an affirmative justification for HE is
not merely a gap waiting to be filled. Rather, the notion that HE should be given independent
normative weight in assessing policy is fundamentally flawed.
It is worth elaborating on this result in two ways. First, consider the logical status of the
example. If one believes that moral principles need to be logically consistent, then this
fundamental failure of HE in the preceding sort of example is decisive. (The fact that, in a
population of hundreds of millions of people, actual violations of the Pareto principle will not
occur is of no moment.)
Nor should it matter that the demonstration involved introducing uncertainty. Again, if
one's principles are to be consistent, they should not lead one astray in any potentially relevant
context. Nor is it acceptable to adopt one set of principles (adhering to HE) when there is no
uncertainty but to shift to an inconsistent set of principles (rejecting HE) when there is some
threshold amount of uncertainty. In any event, introducing uncertainty is entirely realistic.
Uncertainty is pervasive in tax administration and enforcement and in predicting the effects of
tax reforms. My system for evaluating tax policy must be able to address such cases.
Second, this example should be considered in the broader context of previous writing on
welfare economics. As already noted, Harsanyi (1955) first proved almost a half-century ago
that adherence to the Pareto principle combined with basic notions of rationality implies that an
individualistic social welfare function is utilitarian.t7 In the light of this demonstration, it seems
"More precisely, his assumptions were (I) individuals follow the rationality postulates in choosing among
alternatives (that is, he assumed what is required to derive an expected utility function for individual behavior), (2) the
rationality postulates apply to social choices as well, and (3) the Pareto princip]e is respected. (Actually, these
assumptions only imply that welfare must be a weighted sum of individuals' utility. If one further assumes that
individuals should be weighted equally, then the welfare function must be utilitarian.) See Harsanyi (1955, 1977). This
-11 -incumbent on those who advocate conflicting approaches to admit that they reject either the
Pareto principle or one (or more) of the basic rationality postulates and to give some good
reasons for their position. This point seems particularly apropos with respect to AM, who seek to
draw support from the conventional welfare economic approach)8
AH briefly acknowledge the Pareto conflict in the current versions of their papers, but
they question the extension of the principle to cases involving uncertainty, wherein reference is
made to ex ante expected utilities)9 In the present context, however, in which everyone is fully
informed and has the same (correct) probability estimates, it is unclear why the cx ante
perspective is not decisive. Why is it acceptable to make everyone worse off prospectively when
it is unacceptable to do so in a world of certainty? Would AR, for example, favor widespread
governmental restrictions on the ability of fully informed individuals to engage in risky activities
—rangingfrom driving to hiking to entrepreneurship —thatin fact raised those individuals'
derivation of utilitarianism seems to be less well known than Harsanyi (1953), his earlier, and much simpler,
demonstration that rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance would adopt a utilitarian decision rule. See also
vickrey (1945).
"Economists do not often invoke this branch of the welfare economics literature, perhaps because of the general
belief that, in the modern academy, utilitarianism (and welfarism and consequentialism more generally) are not in vogue.
Although this is the case, it is not (in my view) because of the merits of the critical arguments. Critiques of Harsanyi
(himself a philosopher, who has regularly published impressive papers defending utilitarianism in philosophical journals)
are limited. Responses to some of the original utilitarians' powerful arguments, such as Mill's (1863), often ignore his
excellent analysis, which already answers many of the contemporary objections. In addition, modem utilitarians, such as
Hare (198!), have offered elaborate rebuttals to many of the familiar points, which often consist of provocative examples
rather than analytical claims. See generally Kaplow and Shavell (2000), which criticizes many of the arguments of
philosophers and legal academics against welfarism (and more generally against consequentialism).
"Specifically, AR refer to the "extension of the Pareto principle to apply to ex ante expected utilities."
However, one might have thought that it is not really an extension of the Pareto principle to state that the principle is
relevant to assessing govemment policies on health care, unemployment insurance, social security annuities, occupational
health and safety, contract law, and all other matters in which some uncertainty may be involved. Also, they state that the
Pareto principle when applied to settings involving uncertainty "requires .. . thatsocial welfare cannot be averse to ex
post inequalities in the distribution of income," which obviously is incorrect (most obviously because of declining
marginal utility of income). Presumably, they are referring to demonstrations such as Harsanyi's (1955, 1977) that the
Pareto principle, when combined with other assumptions, can be shown to have certain implications for the social welfare
function. But this merely states that, if one is logically consistent and adheres to the Pareto principle, one cannot favor
policies that trump individuals' unanimous preferences.
-12-expected utilities? Although others have likewise questioned demonstrations that employ
uncertainty, it is simply unclear why adding this realistic feature to the analysis should render the
Pareto principle inoperative.
Explanation of second demonstration of Pareto conflict: As it turns out, however, it is
possible to demonstrate that most HE indexes, including that proposed by AH, violate the Pareto
principle even in a world of certainty. Any welfare function that meets very minimal
requirements (notably, continuity, which AH's does) and depends on information other than
individuals' utilities (which AR's does) can be shown to violate the Pareto principle. Kaplow
and Shavell (l999).20
A brief sketch of the argument is as follows. Initially, because the HE-modified welfare
function depends on information other than individuals' utilities (in particular, it depends on
income differences between individuals that are derived using income levels in a reference
distribution of some sort), it is possible that there exist two regimes, Xand X such that
individuals' utility profiles are the same in the two regimes but the welfare evaluation differs.2'
Suppose, for example, that Xis deemed to be strictly socially preferred to X Now, construct
regime X"from regime X'by giving everyone a very small amount more of some good (in the
Al-I construct, one can slightly raise everyone's income). By continuity, we can make this
increase small enough so that X, which was originally strictly socially preferred to X will
'°AH repeatedly emphasize the importance of continuity and the fact that their proposed evaluation function and
corresponding measure of HE are continuous. With regard to non-utility information, their assessment depends on a
factor that is a function of individuals' pre-tax incomes (which, as noted above, are not incomes that anyone ever can
consume and thus obviously are neither uti]ity information nor variables that perfectly correlate with utilities).
'1For the AH method of assessment, one can suppose, for example, that everyone's after-tax income is the same
in Xand in X', but that there is significant HE violation only in X'(because pre-tax incomes are more "scrambled" relative
to after-tax incomes in that regime).
-13-continue to be strictly socially preferred to X' But, by construction, everyone in X"has greater
utility than in X. Hence, the HE-modified welfare function violates the Pareto principle.
Comment: On reflection, the foregoing result should not be that surprising. If a proposed
method of policy evaluation gives weight to something that is not itself a component of
individuals' utilities, then it follows that one is willing to sacrifice individuals' well-being to at
least some extent. (For example, an evaluator who follow AH's prescriptions would strictly
prefer one regime over another because of differences in HE even in cases in which every
individual is precisely as well off in both regimes. By continuity, the evaluator would still
strictly prefer the regime with better HE even when the other regime is somewhat better in terms
of individuals' levels of well-being.) Now, if one simply constructs cases in which this sacrifice
in individuals' well-being happens to be shared, say, pro rata among all individuals, there will
necessarily be a violation of the Pareto principle. It should be apparent, moreover, that this basic
argument holds regardless of the presence of uncertainty, possible differences between ex ante
expected utility and ex post realizations of utility, and the like.
4. Reconciling the Appeal of HE with Its Unacceptability as an Jndependent Normative
Principle
Throughout this comment, I have argued that there has not been offered, and there cannot
really exist, any defensible justification for HE as an independent normative principle, to be
given weight in making social policy decisions, at the expense of individuals' well-being. Yet
one may wonder how this can be. After all, doesn't everyone agree that it is important to treat
equals equally?
The explanation for this apparent paradox, I believe, lies in the fact that unequal treatment
is often something that we care about, but not necessarily in the contexts in which HE measures
-14-are applied. Moreover, we do not care about unequal treatment for reasons independent of
individuals' well-being, not do we care about unequal treatment in ways that are identified by the
indexes of HE that have been proposed in the literature.
With regard to the first point, unequal treatment at the hands of government brings to
mind such phenomena as racial discrimination, religious persecution, prosecution of political
enemies, government officials who act as if they are above the law, and so forth. When one
examines the actual sources of unequal treatment under the existing and various proposed tax
systems, however, these generally are not what one finds.22
To elaborate on the latter two points, it is useful to consider the various ways in which
unequal treatment may serve as a proxy indicator that helps to identify potential problems in the
tax system. There are, as will be seen., many ways that unequal treatment indicates
shortcomings, which further helps to explain why we are inclined to think that HE is important.
In each instance, however, it is the case that violations of HE merely indicate losses in welfare
(as conventionally understood) rather than some other phenomenon that is normatively
significant in its own right. Moreover, it appears that, for the most part, summary measures of
differences in individuals' positions in the pre- versus post-tax distributions of income (and other
HE indexes in the literature) simply are not very probative of the nature of various problems that
may be indicated by the presence of unequal treatment. Following a discussion of these points, I
will illustrate the arguments by examining some particular sources of unequal treatment in the
tax system that are registered by AM's index.
Unequal treatment as a proxy for conventional welfare losses: First, as a matter of
22To be sure, corruption in tax administration that may give rise to unequal treatment is widespread in some
economies. But this is not the sort of unequal treatment that the literature on HE, including AH, addresses.
-15-ordinary welfare maximization, unequal treatment of equals typically will be undesirable.23 If it
maximizes welfare to treat individual 1 in mannerXand not Y, then, if individual 2 is in every
relevant respect identical to individual 1, it usually will be optimal to treat individual 2 in manner
Xand not Y.24 Hence, if we observe individuals I and 2 being treated differently, there is a prima
facie reason to believe that a mistake is being made. Thus, if 1 should be allowed some business
expense deduction to measure his true net income more accurately and 2 is in the identical
situation, 2 typically should be allowed the deduction for the same reason.
Three observations about this case should be noted. (1) Whether individuals I and 2 are
equal in relevant respects may have nothing to do with whether their pre-tax incomes are equal.
(For example, whether two individuals' medical expense deductions should be equal may depend
primarily on whether both individuals were equally sick.) (2) The argument for equal treatment
of individuals involves a failure to maximize welfare, not the difference in treatment per se.25
That is, treating individual 2 incorrectly would involve a mistake even if individual 1 (who is
treated correctly) did not exist. (3) Finally, unequal treatment may not result in "inequity" of any
kind, such as when unequal treatment causes market responses, with the result that only
inefficiency remains (as discussed below).
Second, unequal treatment of equals may raise inequality, conventionally measured.
Typically, unequal treatment adds "noise" to the income distribution, raising the variance and
"There are exceptions, such as when there are nonconvexities, but our intuition about the general problem
presumably reflects the typical case.
'4This point can usually be extended, by continuity, to individuals who are similar rather than identical,
paralleling AH's extension of the notion of HE from identical to similar individuals.
"Thus, under a conventional welfare function, mismeasuring a taxpayer's income (say, by overestimating the
income of some poor people) will result in the imposition of a tax that will tend to reduce welfare relative to what would
otherwise be optimal; no independent measure of HE is appropriate. See Kaplow (1996b).
-16-thus, ceteris paribus, lowering welfare as conventionally measured. For example, if one observes
that a reform does not change the average tax burden of each decile in the income distribution,
one might be misled because, if the variance in each decile rises, there will be greater resulting
inequality. See Atkinson (1980). Hence, it is useful to analyze disaggregated data (such as that
employed by AR in their applications), but the end remains measuring social welfare. Thus, an
unmodified welfare function, not one like AH's that places weight on HE, provides the correct
basis for policy assessment.
Third, and related, provisions that add noise to the system may involve exposing
individuals to risk, which tends to reduce welfare (again, as conventionally measured). And, in
fact, uncertainty does exist in the process of tax assessment and enforcement, even though it
usually is not as extreme as in the illustration in section 2.
Fourth, individuals might be upset by what they view to be arbitrary, unequal treatment.
For example, when individuals learn that others are able to avoid their taxes, they may become
envious. Of course, whether this is true is an empirical question, depending on individuals'
actual tastes about such matters and whether they are aware of the unequal treatment. With
regard to the latter, it is worth noting that the sort of HE violation that can be uncovered only by
applying a sophisticated HE index to detailed data sets is unlikely to be an important actual
source of envy. (Indeed, most individuals probably do not know their neighbors' taxes, nor
whether those who benefit from various tax provisions do or do not have nearly the same pre-tax
income.) In any case, if individuals prefer to be treated equally, this taste would count in a
proper measure of social welfare, just as would any other taste, because the taste would be
-17-reflected in individuals' utility functions.26 There is no independent normative principle
involved.
Furthermore, it is not obvious whether any envious preferences that may exist in this
context are limited to or even focused on unequal treatment of individuals with equal (or similar)
pre-tax incomes. Working class individuals, for example, may be more upset by the unique
access of the rich to myriad tax loopholes than by the tax avoidance of their own class. And we
might suppose that they would be more, not less, upset if they knew that every rich person took
advantage of such loopholes rather than only some of them, the opposite of the HE problem
(which would exist only if there were unequal treatment among the rich). It also seems plausible
that the most likely sources of upset from unequal treatment would arise from particular
provisions that were understood to involve improper discrimination (such as taxes that differed
by race or religion).27 In all, it does not seem that aggregate HE measures of the AH type would
be very good at identif'ing what actually makes taxpayers upset.
Additional possibilities could be noted. Consider, for example, the earlier discussion of
concerns about the abuse of power. It is also the case that, in making political judgments,
decisionmakers will wish to know who gains, who loses, and when individuals are treated
unequally, as this will allow a better assessment of the legislative vote count, who may be
depended upon to make campaign contributions, and how one's constituents are likely to react.28
'6AH at one point make comments suggestive of individuals having tastes pertaining to unequal treatment, but
their observation is used to motivate a welfare function that does not depend only on individuals' utilities rather than a
modification to individuals' utility functions.
27Another instance where some taxpayers maybe upset involves the marriage penalty (and other rules regarding
how family units are treated differently). See the discussion below.
2SThis final set of concerns is more relevant to the problem of predicting govemment behavior (political
economy) than that of evaluating the effects of policy (welfare economics). In any case, the relevance of HE indexes is
dubious in this context as well. There maybe natural groupings of individuals, such as farmers, retirees, and soon. But
-18-In summary, a number of conclusions arc apparent. First, there are many reasons why
observed instances of unequal treatment may suggest relevant concerns. This helps to explain
why we instinctively feel that HE is important. Second, we know that equal treatment is
important in other contexts and, indeed, in the post-civil-rights-movement era in which we live,
we have internalized the notion that equality is important in its own right. This further explains
our automatic inclination to be concerned about unequal treatment. Third, and most importantly,
none of this implies that HE is an independent normative principle. Rather, in each instance, we
can identify rather precisely how concerns about unequal treatment dissolve into matters of
social welfare, as conventionally measured. Fourth, the HE indexes presented in the literature —
includingAH's new measure —seemlargely unrelated to the identified bases for concern about
unequal treatment.
Sources of unequal treatment that are captured by HE indexes: One point of the
preceding discussion was that most of the problems that may exist when there is unequal
treatment of equals are not well diagnosed by an index of HE. I now consider some of what is
captured by HE indexes.
One major source of potential unequal treatment involves the tax treatment of different
family configurations. In such instances, there is often genuine disagreement about who should
be deemed to be equal to whom in the first place. As AR make clear in their discussion of this
subject, one first must resolve these disputes before one knows how to measure any loss in HE in
the tax system. The FIlE index proposed by AR cannot help to identif, or resolve such
each group's lobbyist is presumably concerned about the treatment of his group versus everyoiw else, not about the degree
of equality of treatment within the various groups,
-19-problems 29
Asimilar situation exists with respect to many tax deductions, such as the medical
expense deduction (also addressed by AH). Allowing this deduction will reduce the measure of
HE if the pre-tax reference distribution is taken to be, say, adjusted gross income, but will
increase HE if the reference distribution is defined as pre-tax income minus medical expenses.
As AH suggest, we will have identified real —ratherthan spurious —reductionsin HE only
when we have first identified a provision that we believe incorrectly measures the ideal tax base.
But if this is the case, we will have already reached our policy .Ifit should turn out that we need
some measure of the extent of an existing problem (perhaps how much we mismeasure ability to
pay by using an incorrect provision for medical expenses), the measure should be derived from
the same principles that motivate our tax regime and guide us in identifying the ideal tax base —
thatis, the principles that tell us what is incorrect about the provision. There is no need for a
generic measure with an aesthetically appealing functional form but with no apparent coimection
to the principles at hand.3° This concern seems seem applicable to many tax provisions.
Another important characteristic of HE indexes is that much of the inequity that they do
measure is spurious. One of the main instances in which an index like AH's will register
reductions of HE is when pre-tax prices (including wages and rates of return on investments) are
291 would note further that the usual manner of talking about these sorts of problems is itself deficient in a
manner akin to the problems with justifying HE as an independent normative principle. After all, what is meant by
asserting that one or another definition of the family unit is "better"? Presumably, what should matter is not the resolution
of semantic debates but rather the outcome of actual policies and, in particular, their effects on individuals' well-being.
Thus, the question of what is the right way to conceive of the family unit for tax purposes is usefully restated as the
question of which tax rules regarding families best promote social welfare. This is a problem that can be addressed
directly, using the conventional welfare economic framework. See Kaplow (1996a).
'°Suppose, for example, that a tax deduction is undesirable because it implicitly subsidizes wasteful
entertainment expenditures. The proper measure of the extent of the problem would be one that indicates the extent of
inefficiency, not an index of HE.
-20-influenced by the tax system itself, which is often the case. (Remember that the AH index
privileges the pre-tax distribution of income, which, of course, depends on pre-tax prices.)
Consider the familiar example of tax-free interest on municipal bonds. Two taxpayers
have identical pre-tax incomes, all from bond interest. One has all taxable interest. The other
has all tax-free interest. After-tax, the former has a lower income. An index like that proposed
by AH will identify an inequity. The problem, as we all know, is that the two individuals were
not equal pre-tax. Rather, the one with municipal bonds must have had a greater investment in
order to earn the same interest, so his ending up with more after-tax income is correct.
Suppose instead that one compared two investors with the same wealth, one investing in
municipal bonds and one in taxable bonds. Here, the AM measure would also show a violation
of HE, because the individual with taxable bonds had greater pre-tax income but only equal after-
tax income. (Recall that the AH measure does not confine itself to comparisons of precise pre-
tax equals.) But we know that this too is misleading: it is not really correct to say that the
individual investing in municipal bonds "pays no taxes"; rather, the pre-tax return on the
municipal bonds is depressed relative to the taxable rate of return. These two taxpayers are, in
reality, treated equally.
This example is hardly atypical. Pre-tax rates of return on all investmentsranging
from rental real estate to manufacturing equipment to timber land —tendto be influenced by the
tax system. With regard to labor income, a variety of fringe benefits as well as nonpecuniary
amenities and disamenities ofjobs will be reflected in pre-tax wages and thus confound the HE
index. The general (and familiar) point is, as Bittker (1979) observed, that inefficiencies tend to
drive out inequities because the market takes the tax system into account.
-21-Consider the implications of this phenomenon for a measure of HE based on pre-tax
incomes. In general, one would expect that many identified losses in HE will involve no
inequity at all.31 Moreover, if one could measure true or comprehensive pre-tax income more
accurately (as AR's discussion implicitly suggests would be appropriate), one might then find
even more instances of apparent losses in HE that involve no inequity at all, even accepting HE
as a valid normative principle. For example, if we included the value of free travel available to
airline employees in measuring their pre-tax income, they would appear to have a lower tax rate
than others with the same pre-tax income, but this would ignore that compensating wage
differentials already take any tax benefit into account.
5. Conclusion
Horizontal equity should not be measuredand new measures of social welfare should
not be deployed —untilwe know what we are trying to measure and why. Auerbach and
Hassett, like previous authors on the subject, develop indexes of HE without addressing these
foundational questions. To adopt their approach is to ask society to sacrifice individuals' well-
being, yet there is no indication of what we are getting in return. I have suggested that there is in
fact no good argument for viewing HE as an independent evaluative principle and that pursuing
HE is in conflict with the very core of welfare economics, the Pareto principle.
Despite these criticisms, most of us feel that equal treatment of equals is important. This
concern is apt in other settings, and unequal treatment often indicates problems in the tax policy
context. But these problems all involve reductions in social welfare, conventionally understood,
and do not signal the existence of some independent evaluative principle. Moreover, measures of
"This problem isoneof thereasons that priorwriters, such as Feldstein (1976), offered for using the pre-reforni
(status quo), afier-tax distribution as a benchmark and focusing on the effects of tax changes.
-22 -HE, including the new one advanced by AR, do not seem to be related to the sorts of problems
that may exist. Thus, there is no basis for continuing to develop increasingly refined measures of
HE.
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